Abstract: The evolutionary roots of human moral behavior are a key precondition to 21 understand human nature. Here we investigate whether a biological version of Fifth 22
Commandment ("Honor your father and your mother, that your days may be long"), 23 respected in different variants across cultures, can spread through Darwinian competition. 24
We show by a novel demographic model that a corresponding Fifth Rule ("During your 25 reproductive period, give away from your resources to your post-fertile parents") will 26 spread even if the cost of support to post-fertile grandmothers considerably decreases the 27 demographic parameters of fertile parents but radically increases the survival rate of 28 grandchildren. Teaching vital cultural content is likely to have been critical for the value of 29 grandparental service. Selection on such behavior may have produced an innate moral 30 tendency to honor parents even in situations, such as experienced today, when the 31 quantitative conditions would not necessarily favor the maintenance of this trait. 32 33 Keywords: 5th commandment, intra-familiar resource transfer, kin demography, 34 menopause, grandmother, grandchild 35 36 37 1. Background 38 Darwin [1] already raised the possibility that moral has evolutionary origin. There are 39 several models rooted in evolutionary theory that shed light on some basic moral issue [2] [3] [4] [5] . 40
In contrast, we start with a moral commandment, and investigate whether a phenotype 41 corresponding to this moral commandment wins in a Darwinian struggle for existence or not, 42 similar to an investigation of the conditions under which spiteful behavior will die out [6] . 43
Here we investigate the cultural norm that promotes the help of the parents (we discuss the 44 issue of grandfathers later). We refer to this norm as the Fifth commandment (see 45
Supplementary Information, see SI). This norm has obvious links to biology, and variants of 46 it can also be found in various cultures ranging from the East to the West (SI). There is 47 widespread evidence not just for the existence of such norm but for the actual support as well. 48
The form of this support can vary across cultures (emotional, instrumental, financial, etc.) 49 and might be a function of other factors, such as the health of the elderly parents, but this 50 kind of help is readily observed across different cultures [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Investigating the dynamics 51 of such norm can shed light on the evolutionary roots of religion also [12] . 52
53
In the course of standard human life history infants grow to become parents who age 54 into being grandparents. Thus, longevities permitting, respect and help to parents turn out to 55 be targeted to the grandparents of one's children. This truism has important consequences for 56 the possible spread of such a behavioral trait. Behaviors can be inherited, which can be the 57 result of either genetic or cultural transmission. This inheritance assumption immediately 58 the "training" of their grandchildren [28] . The attained skills and knowledge during 81 childhood can increase the survival rate and fecundity for the whole adult life period of the 82 grandchildren; see Figure 1 .a-c for a comparison of these alternatives. These three hypotheses 83 do not necessary exclude each other since the care for pre-fertile individuals includes 84 breastfeeding, transport, feeding and protection as well as affection and education [25, 29, 85 30] . 86
All these hypotheses are aimed at explaining the evolutionary advantage of the long 87 post-fertile life period of Homo sapiens. However, none of them assumes a transfer of 88 resources from the parents to the grandparents, thus none of them investigates the trade-off 89 situation between parental reproduction or survival and the support to grandparents. The 90 central question is this: Will support to post-fertile grandmothers spread even if there is a 91 trade-off between this support and either the fecundity or the survival rate of fertile parents? 92 93 Chu & Lee [3] investigated the evolution of intergenerational transfer (IT) from 94 parents to grandparents in the framework of a cooperative game and they already pointed out 95 that "filial piety" can evolve by division of labor. Fertile female transfers some energy to her 96 mother, enabling the latter to redirect her efforts from inefficient foraging to grandchildren 97 care. During this time the fertile female is free from caring and she can go to forage with 98 higher efficiency than her mother. In other words, this model describes a synergistic situation 99 where everyone does the task she is the most efficient in. But the authors do not consider the 100 trade-off we wish to investigate (see Figure 1 .
d). 101
We strongly concur with the statement that "Even to demonstrate, for example, that post 103 reproductive women result in a reduction in grandchild mortality does not establish that 104 menopause is adaptive unless it can be demonstrated that overall fitness is actually 105 Since there is a difference in intra-familiar support between families, the Leslie 126 matrices of different family types are different. What kind of intra-familiar support ensures 127 the highest long-term growth rate for the family? For sake of simplicity we denote help from 128 the grandmothers to children as "forward help" and help from the parents to the grandparents 129 as "backward help". (See Fig.1 for comparison of the different models.) Under well-known 130 conditions (fulfilled in our case), the unique positive eigenvalue of Leslie-matrix is the long-131 yellow arrows denote backward transfer of resources from the parents to the grandparents. 140
Upward blue and downward red arrows denote positive and negative effects from trade-offs 141 respectively. (a) Standard life-history model, no menopause, no forward help and no 142 backward help; (b) grandmother (purple arrow from VI to I)/ altriciality (grey arrow from 143 VI to I) hypothesis: menopause evolved, no backward help from parents to grandmothers; 144 (c) mother and/or embodied capital hypothesis: menopause evolved, no backward help 145 from parents to grandmothers; (d) filial piety: menopause evolved, synergistic division of 146 labor with backward help from parents to grandmothers, no trade-offs; (e) Fifth rule: 147 menopause evolved, backward help from parents to grandmothers, three-way trade-off for 148 the parents between survival, fecundity and helping the grandmothers; (f) Fifth Rule: 149 menopause evolved, backward help from parents to grandmothers, two-way trade-off for 150 the parents between fecundity and helping the grandmothers. 151 152
Grandmother hypothesis 153
Consider the case when fertile individuals do not support grandmothers (see Figure  154 1.e for a general depiction of the idea). We consider the following two cases (see Matherials 155 and Methods): (i) If grandmothers do not help in child care, but their survival linearly reduces 156 their own fecundity, then the optimal strategy is not to spend on own survival to post-fertile 157 
(see Table 1 for notation, *  denotes 10 reproductive age allocates her resource between own survival and fecundity. Note that we 162 have adopted the hypothesis that the cost spent on living to the post-fertile age reduces 163 fecundity. Without this trade-off, living to the post-fertile age is a neutral property in the first 164 case, and a benefit in the second case. 165
166 Table 1 . Notation of the model. The Fifth Rule will spread if the cost of support to post-fertile grandmothers decreases 189 slightly the demographic parameters of fertile parents, but sufficiently increases the survival 190 rate of grandchildren. However, in general, there is a threshold over which support to 191 grandmothers has no evolutionary advantage. If the cost of support to post-fertile 192 grandmothers only decreases the demographic parameters of the family, but it offers no 193 increase in the survival rate of the grandchildren, then the Fifth Rule has no evolutionary 194 advantage. The mother hypothesis and "embodied capital model" should imply that 195 grandmothers increase the survival rate of their children and that of grandchildren during their lives. Thus, if these ideas also work in human evolution then it is even "easier" for the 197 Fifth Rule to evolve (see Materials and Methods). Since we are dealing with "family issues" the natural conceptual framework is that of 211 kin selection. Our problem does not, however, readily yield to standard inclusive fitness 212 modeling, since the latter is not sensitive to demography. There are different contributions to 213 a female's fitness from the three stages of her life-history: girl, mother and grandmother. Our 214 demographic model can account for these complications in a straightforward manner. Note 215 also that our account involves an unusual loop from parent to grandparent to grandchild. Our 216 analysis applies to grandfathers as well, provided the menopause in grandmothers constrains 217 the realized fertility of the former in a similar way. one, according to the catholic numbering) states: "Honor your father and your mother, that 244 your days may be long in the land that the LORD your God is giving you." (Exodus 20:12) 245
From the interpretations of this commandment by the western churches we recall the 246 following: Sefer Ha-chinukh (mitzva 33) elaborates: "A person should realize that his father and mother are the cause of his existence in this world; therefore it is appropriate that he 248 render them all the honor and do them all the service he can". St. Thomas Aquinas wrote: 249 "Since we receive nourishment from our parents in our childhood, we must support them in 250 their old age." Martin Luther said: "For he who knows how to regard them in his heart will 251 not allow them to suffer want or hunger, but will place them above him and at his side, and 252 will share with them whatever he has and possesses" (Luther, M. p. 29). 253
We also note that in China, to take care of elderly parents is also a moral rule: e.g. Confucius 254 declared: "In serving his parents, a filial son reveres them in daily life; he makes them happy 255 while he nourishes them; he takes anxious care of them in sickness …" (26) 256
Based on the above, we introduce the so-called Fifth Rule, which is a translation of the Fifth 257 Commandment into biological terms and is inherent in the above interpretations: "During 258 your reproductive period, give away from your resources to your post-fertile parents." 259 We consider the following age-structured model with two sub-models. The development of 271 a family is described by the following Leslie matrix, which contains the survival and 272 fecundity parameters of pre-fertile and fertile individuals, and all entries depend on the level 273 of the intra-familiar (backward) help, denoted by y: 274
are the survival rate and fecundity of fertile parents, respectively. Figure SI1 need some density dependent selection to keep the total density of these two phenotypes at 300 the carrying capacity. Since in the considered selection situation there is no interaction 301 between the phenotypes and we assume that the phenotypes differ only in the demographic 302 parameters, thus we can suppose there is a uniform survival process, i.e. the survival rate 303 corresponding to the carrying capacity is the same for all individuals. Now the question arises 304 which phenotype will win in the struggle for existence on the long selection time scale? 305 Let us suppose that phenotypes A and B develop according to Leslie models having the 306 respective population vectors ) (t x , ) (t z , and matrices LA, LB, total densities 307
. Then the relative frequency of phenotype B tends to zero, 308 as it is shown below: 309
Indeed, let us suppose that the subpopulations start from initial states ) 0 ( x and ) 0 ( z , 310 respectively, and the time unit is chosen in such a way that in unit time the total density of 311 the system always exceeds the carrying capacity K, in particular 312
(2) 313
Now, by the selection the total density of the system is reduced to K proportionally: 314
We emphasize that in this model we consider the "intrinsic" survival (described by the Leslie 318 matrices) and the survival under selection independently. However, this model can be 319 formally considered as a particular Leslie-type model depending on the total density of the 320 system, where each demographic parameter in the Leslie matrices A L and B L is multiplied 321
Similarly, for all t= 1, 2, 3,… we get our kin demographic selection model for two different 323 phenotypes:
Now, for the proportion of phenotype B we obtain 327
Since we can suppose that in both phenotypes the last two fecundities are positive, so the 331 Perron-Frobenius theorem (see e.g. 28) implies that both . In fact, the Leslie matrices can be cut at the last fertile age class, 333 apply the Perron-Frobenius theorem to these matrices, and then the convergence can be 334 extended to the post fertile age groups by simple survival Therefore,
(8) 337
Thus if B A    , then the relative frequency of phenotype B tends to zero as t tends to infinity.
Observe that in our model, the fecundity of a phenotype is determined by a phenotype-339 dependent Leslie matrix, and the survival rates corresponding to the carrying capacity of 340 different phenotypes are the same, so the long-term growth rate of a phenotype determines 341 the fitness. 342 Under assumption 1 there is a threshold for the support to grandparents, above which 384 the survival of grandparents does not increase, and therefore the survival of grandchildren 385 either, but the fecundity and/or the survival of fertile parents still decrease. Over this 386 threshold, the support to grandparents has no evolutionary advantage. 387 388 Finally, we remark that the above reasoning can be applied not only to the 389 grandmother hypothesis, since either the mother hypothesis or the embodied capital model 390 alone can ensure the support to grandparents. For example, if any of the above two 391 hypotheses implies the increase of at least one of the numerators in (3), while the rest of the 392 numerators do not decrease, then the dominant eigenvalue, i.e. the asymptotic growth rate 393 will increase. Of course, if in addition to the fact that the grandmother increases the survival 394 of her grandchildren and the survival and fertility of her daughter, the hypothesis of the 395 embodied capital model also holds (the grandmother also increases the adult age survival and 396 fertility of her grandchildren), then not only   k i i y 1 ) (  but also factor (4) can synergically 397 increase the asymptotic growth rate of the family. 398
Finally, we note that the "altriciality" hypothesis can also be handled in terms of a individuals do not support grandmothers. We consider the following two cases: (i) Suppose 423 that grandmothers do not help in child care, but their survival linearly reduces their own 424
is the cost spent on survival 425 to post-fertile age (Figure 3 .a depicts the situation). The fitness of the population is the 426 long-term growth rate which can be calculated from the characteristic equation of the Leslie 427 matrix:
, and the optimal strategy is not to spend on own survival to 428 post-fertile age. (ii) Suppose that grandmothers help in child care (Figure 3.b 
. This condition is satisfied e.g., if the efficiency of the support to post-460 fertile parents is sufficiently large compared to the basic post-fertile survival rate. 461 
. We note that these technical conditions imply 487 that 1  and 0  are the demographic parameters before the appearance of the 488 considered traits, while 0 )
Observe that conditions c) and d) are mathematical descriptions of trade-offs. 492 
).
(18) 500
The first order necessary condition for the maximum attained at an interior point is 501
Since p, q,   , are all positive in the interval (0,1), the above necessary condition is 504 equivalent to 505 In this section, by numerical study, we illustrate the effect of different (linear, convex and 533 concave) trade-offs on the level of the optimal backward help (y*). We calculated the 534 maximal long-term growth rate (fitness) of various populations as a function of y from the 535 characteristic equation of the corresponding Leslie matrix. The value of y that gives the 536 highest long-term growth rate termed as the optimal backward help (y*). We also calculated 537 the number of offspring and the offspring survival given the optimal y*. We investigated 538 the effects of different cost-benefit parameters on the evolvability of backward help (y). 539
Life-history parameters are based on the figures from Mace (27) . It is possible to generate 540 all the possible combinations of cost-benefit trade-offs by setting the appropriate cost, 541 benefit parameters to zero (c, d, h). Also, convex or concave cost-benefit functions can be achieved by setting the appropriate parameters (c, d, h) to smaller or to greater than one 543 (see Table 2 for a summary of parameters). We used the following general Leslie matrix 544 (see Figure 5 Four possible combinations exist in terms of the benefit functions: (i) a12, a21 > 0; 557 (ii) a12 > 0, a21 = 0, (iii) a12 = 0, a21 > 0; and (iv) a12, a21 = 0. In the first case, grandmothers 558
give benefits for both the number of offspring and for the survival of them, in the second 559 case they give benefit only for the number of offspring; in the third case they only give 560 benefit for the survival of the offspring and finally, in the last case, they do not provide any 561
In the same way, four possible combinations exist in terms of the cost functions: (i) 563 c, d > 0; (ii) c > 0, d = 0, (iii) c = 0, d > 0; and (iv) c, d = 0. In the first case helping 564 grandmothers imposes a cost on both the parents' reproductive output and on the parents' 565 survival, in the second case only on the number of offspring, in the third only on the 566 survival of the parent, and finally, in the last case it imposes no cost at all. Just as before, 567 this last case is not interesting for us, thus it will not be investigated any further. See Table  568 3 for investigated parameter combinations. 569 Figure S1-S3 ). Linear cost and benefit functions 578 do not favour the evolution of IT (Figs. S1, S4, S6, d=1, h=1); conversely, convex benefit 579 and concave cost functions promote the evolution of IT (Fig. S2, S3 , S5, S7, d=0.5, h=2). It 580 is possible to find cost parameters (c, d) where IT evolves even if the efficacy parental 581 transfer and grandparental help (a21 and b respectively) is low (Figs. S2, S3 ). Conversely, it 582 is possible to find (high) a21, b parameters where IT evolves even if it imposes a high cost on 583 the survival of the parents or on the number of offspring (d and c, respectively, see Figs. S1, 584 S2). 585 586
